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Abstract 
 
The BSE crisis represents one of the worst policy disasters experienced by a UK government in 
recent years.  In material terms, it led to the slaughter of 3.3 million cattle and an estimated 
economic loss of £3.7 billion.  In administrative terms, the crisis led to the dissolution of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF), an institution that was heavily criticised 
by the Phillips Inquiry for its lack of openness and transparency.  Although far less severe in 
terms of its economic impact, with estimated losses of between Euro 0.8 and 1.05 billion, the 
German BSE crisis resulted in extensive political fallout, leading, inter alia, to the resignation of 
two government ministers. 
 
This paper compares the handling of the crisis in the UK and Germany and the regulation put in 
place in its aftermath.  It explores the reasons for the failure of both governments to manage this 
crisis in a credible, timely and proactive fashion.  Examining the institutional contexts in which 
decisions about scientific evidence on BSE were made, the paper argues that, in both countries, 
a centralised system, in which government agencies controlled “science for government”, was 
vulnerable to expert-interest group alliances which undermined the potential for a credible 
assessment of public health and safety risks.  Looking at the policies adopted in the aftermath of 
these crises, the paper notes that, although being far less affected by BSE, Germany 
paradoxically adopted far more rigorous measures for the prevention of future incidents, which 
included the strict administrative separation of the risk assessment and management functions.  
Our paper concludes that the extent of administrative reforms which are initiated in response to 
crises is more likely to correspond to that general receptiveness of the political environment to 
these reforms, than the ‘objective’ impact of the crisis itself. 
 
Key Words: 
 
Accountability, BSE, Expert Judgement, Mismanagement, Phillips Inquiry, Risk Assessment, 
Risk Management, Risk Communication. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The ‘Risk Society’ debate has long since established the notion that good governance of risk is 
fundamentally a matter of good government (Renn, 2007).  In this paper, we argue that, if 
governments are to handle current and future animal to human health risks effectively, such as 
that which may be posed by ‘Bird Flu’, then their actions should be predicated upon ‘open 
science’, sound communications and appropriate regulatory and institutional frameworks.  To 
illustrate our argument, we compare the handling of the ‘BSE crisis’ in the UK and Germany 
and the regulations put in place in its aftermath.  Examining the institutional contexts in which 
decisions about scientific evidence on BSE were made, the paper argues that, in both countries, 
a centralised system, in which government agencies controlled’ science for government’ was 
vulnerable to expert-interest group alliances, which undermined the potential for a credible and 
open assessment of public health and safety risks.  However, using print media indicators of 
scientific articles published in both countries, we find evidence of a more ‘risk sensitive’ culture 
in Germany as compared to Britain, which may have been responsible for the more pronounced 
political fallout associated with the German BSE crisis.  
 
Our paper concludes that political receptiveness is a major factor in the good governance of 
crises such as BSE, but notes that this receptiveness can become skewed if the science 
underlining policy and strategy lacks ‘risk sensitivity’.  In doing so, the paper highlights some 
important weaknesses within the UK approach to the management of animal-health risks that 
appears to be following a path dependent legacy (Teece et al. 1997) established at the time of 
the BSE crisis, and which could lead key ministries and agencies to repeat similar mistakes in 
their management of the H5N1 outbreak in Suffolk.  This path dependency centres, in our view, 
around the treatment of BSE, and H5N1, as, foremostly, animal health problems; and a 
tendency, therein, to see zoonoses and human health protection as a second stage issue.  We 
conclude that the tendency of UK research to view BSE as an animal health problem, as 
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compared to the German tendency to view it as a human health problem, may explain both the 
shorter duration of the crises in Germany and the more radical reforms, including the strict 
institutional separation of risk assessment and management, which were adopted in Germany. 
However, it remains to be seen whether these radical institutional reforms present a sufficient 
barrier to the manipulation of government risk management activities, especially in instances 
where the interests of powerful producer groups are at stake (Bourdieu, 1998). 
 
The paper is divided into seven further sections. The opening section positions the BSE crisis 
within contemporary debates about the nature of risk.  Next, the paper reviews the government 
history of the BSE crisis as it ensued in the UK and Germany.  Section three of the paper then 
considers how a science of BSE emerged in the UK and Germany, using an analysis of print 
media indicators.  In conclusion, we consider how this science has framed the treatment of BSE, 
as a continuing, if somewhat shrouded, animal and human health risk in the UK.  In doing so, 
the paper contends that the ‘German Model’, whilst far from perfect, represents a more effective 
institutional and regulatory framework for the curtailment of potential epidemics such as BSE, 
and possibly, Avian Flu. 
 
2. Background 
 
In a recent commons statementi, the Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs, David Milibandii, attempted to assuage renewed public and political concerns about the 
risks posed to human health by the arrival  of the H5N1 strain of ‘Avian Flu’ or ‘Bird Flu’ in the 
United Kingdom.  His statement to the House followed several days of heightened media 
interest in an outbreak of the deadly Asian strain of the H5N1 pathogen, on the 1st February, at 
Bernard Matthew’s poultry farm in Holton, Suffolkiii.  Whilst only a few days elapsed between 
the notification of the Suffolk outbreak and Miliband’s statement, it did not take long for the 
spectre of ‘BSE’ to feature prominently within newspaper editorialsiv, and Radio phone-ins on 
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the subjectv.  There is a strong sense, therefore, of history repeating itself at the present time; 
and of hollow government assurances.  Ironically, John Gummer, the former Conservative 
Secretary for Agriculture, and key political casualty of the BSE debacle, is also the local MP for 
the Suffolk Coastal Region. He has recently raised concerns in Parliament about government 
handling of the avian flu crisis, and the potential for contamination beyond the borders of 
Suffolkvi. 
 
There are further links between the two crises beyond the ‘sixth degree of separation’ between 
John Gummer and David Miliband. Over different time periods, the UK and Germany both 
faced a BSE ‘crisis’ in the sense that (1) there was a widely held public perception that 
government agencies had misinformed the public about the real dangers of the disease to 
humans, (2) the extent of its spread among animals, (3) the degree of its controllability as animal 
disease; and, perhaps most importantly, (4) the capacity for front-line institutions to manage and 
ultimately eliminate this food hazard. 
 
Yet in terms of their extent the two crises differed significantly. The UK BSE (Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopathy) crisis led to the slaughter of more than 3 million cattle and an 
estimated economic loss of £11 billion (Euro 16 billion) (Beck et al., 2005).  The German BSE 
crisis was far less severe by comparison, leading to the slaughter of an estimated 85,000 cattle 
and estimated losses of between Euro 0.8 and 1.05 billion (Klett-Aktualitätendienst, 2001/2002).  
Despite its relatively limited economic impact and its overall shorter duration, the German BSE 
crisis set into motion a fundamental re-examination of what became known as a perceived  ‘iron 
triangle’ between rural politicians, agricultural interests and government agencies responsible 
for agricultural issues.  
 
In Britain, by contrast, the BSE crisis was largely perceived as a self-contained management 
failure, which, although undermining public confidence in government policies on food safety 
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did not lead to deep-seated questioning of the underlying relationship between, and legitimacy 
of, these interest groups.  This outlook was very much confirmed in the Phillips inquiry, which, 
as post-crisis public inquiry, sought to identify the causes of  mismanagement, poor 
communication with the public, and overarching patterns of decision making – without 
addressing the undue influence certain interest groups had played during the crisis (Phillips 
Inquiry, 2000). 
 
As an animal disease, BSE can be defined as an incurable neurological disorder affecting 
primarily cattle.  The practical concern with BSE can be largely attributed to the existence of  a 
human version of BSE, known as ‘new variant’ Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (nCJD), which 
mainly affects young people.  It is generally assumed that BSE is transmitted through the food 
chain (Ebinger et al. 1998, pp.265-275) and that its root cause can be traced to processed meat 
and bone meal which was added as a protein supplement to cattle feed (DoH and MAFF 1989, 
p.36; Ford, 1996, p.20; Anon 1998, p.22).  Researchers such as Wilesmith (Wilesmith et al. 
1998) have hypothesised that the introduction of cost-saving rationalisations to meat and bone 
meal production in the 1970’s lowered the processing temperature of this feed supplement, 
which increased the probability of the survival of BSE agents. Additionally, Kimberlin (1993) 
has suggested that these processes concentrated and caused genetic mutations which modified 
the disease and increased its infectivity. 
 
Although some researchers suspect that BSE was present in European cattle herds from the 
1940’s onwards (Brown 1998, p.252), the first BSE case in the UK was diagnosed in 1985, and 
in Germany in 2000 (Imort, 2001, p.3).  Following a spread of the BSE epidemic in the UK and 
a ban on high risk meat and milk from infected cattle by the UK government in 1988, Germany 
and France imposed a ban on British beef imports in 1989, which the EU Commission  removed 
later on.  Despite measures to remove contaminated feed, the number of BSE infected cattle 
continued to rise from 2,524 in 1988 to a peak of 37,280 in 1992 (Beck et. al., 2005).  When the 
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UK government admitted in 1996 that a link between BSE and CJD could not be ruled out, the 
EU imposed a worldwide ban on UK beef and beef products which resulted in the slaughter of 
more than 4 million British cows (Anon, 2000).  Restrictions on the export of British beef were 
only lifted in 2006, when measures regarding animal feed and BSE detection had been fully 
implemented in the UK.  Between 1988 and 2001 a total of 180,802 cattle were identified as 
having BSE. 
 
The discovery of a first born cow with BSE in Germany in November 2000 resulted in a ban on 
animal derived food supplement within the same month.  When in January 2001 the 10th case of 
BSE in Germany was detected, the Green party health minister (equivalent to the UK Secretary 
of Health) and the Minister of Agriculture were forced to resign, amidst public accusations of 
incompetence and mismanagement.  Partly due to the withdrawal of contaminated feed infected 
cattle, the German BSE crisis peaked in 2001 with 125 cattle.  However in 2002 a further 106 
cattle were identified as infected, and even in 2006, seven cattle were slaughtered on account of 
BSE infection.  Despite the far smaller extend of the BSE crisis, the German authorities appear 
to have had significant problems in handling and ending this crisis.  Specifically there is 
evidence that protracted negotiations between federal and state governments about 
compensation and responsibilities for disease monitoring led to unnecessary delays which 
proved costly to farmers while undermining consumer confidence. 
 
Despite differences in the extent of the crises and the institutional structures which attempted to 
manage them, the risk management failures in both countries followed broadly similar patterns.  
Specifically, both government scientists in both countries attempted to convince the public that 
there BSE represented no significant risk to humans and that the crisis could be managed 
speedily through relatively simple and easily enforceable regulatory measures.  Only when the 
statements were proven demonstrably wrong by the further detection of BSE infected cattle 
were additional measures introduced and the initially optimistic statements about a speedy 
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resolution of the crises withdrawn. As a consequence of these overly optimistic statements and 
the unwillingness to communicate fully the risks and uncertainties associated with this new 
cattle disease, the government sponsored science of BSE was gradually discredited together with 
the public trust in the respective governments’ ability to police and maintain food safety. 
 
3. The UK BSE Crisis 
 
The UK BSE crisis has been analysed in detail by a public inquiry chaired by Phillips which 
published its extensive report in 2000 (Phillips Inquiry, 2000).  The Phillips report suggests that 
the main body responsible for conducting scientific research and for advising the government on 
BSE, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) established a pattern of restricting 
information to relevant professional groups, the media and the public early on during the crisis.   
Apparently, BSE infected cattle were detected in the UK throughout the years 1985 and 1986. 
Yet up until mid 1987, MAFF communicated no BSE relevant information to UK veterinarians.  
In the latter half of 1987 a circular letter by MAFF instructed veterinarians not to pass nay BSE 
relevant information to universities or other researchers.  
 
By the end of 1987, the number of BSE infected cattle had reached 137 and report of a national 
epidemic surfaced in the UK press.  In response, MAFF established its first expert advisory 
group in May 1988.  This group, the Southwood Working Party, was tasked with identifying the 
potential risks which BSE could pose to humans.  The Southwood group published its report in 
February 1989 (DoH and MAFF 1989), which suggested that there was a potential link between 
meat and bone meal and BSE.  By stating that cattle were the dead end host for BSE, the report 
failed to address the possibility of a threat to humans.  Additionally, the report failed to address 
how infected cattle without clinical signs could be prevented from entering the food chain. 
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Ultimately, despite the resistance of some Cabinet ministers, it was decided that the 
recommendation to exclude high-risk material from baby food would be published with the 
explanation that it was a measure of “extreme caution”.  Perhaps predictably, subsequent 
discussions in the media focused on the implications of the baby food recommendation, this 
defeating MAFF’s attempt to stem a future BSE panic (Phillips Inquiry, 2000).  Apart from the 
exclusion of high-risk material from baby foods, the report included a number of less 
controversial recommendations, such as the urgent introduction of a ban on infected animals 
entering the human food chain, and the creation of an expert body with the remit of directing 
future BSE research (DoH and MAFF, 1989). 
 
Recent analyses  have suggested that the Southwood Working Party’s identification of BSE as 
an animal disease had far reaching implications for future investigations, in that is “effectively 
closed the door on further research into the human health risks of infected beef” (Crace, 2001: 
13).  The Southwood Working Party had produced a contradictory report, which, while giving 
an evidence-based assessment of animal related threats, categorically ruled out the possibility of 
the disease posing a threat to humans (DoH and MAFF, 1989).  Despite the growing amount of 
unorthodox scientific opinion (Lacey, 1994; 1998; Almond et al. 1995; Ford 1996) the 
Southwood Working Party and the subsequent committees largely adhered to an ‘approved’ 
view (Kewell and Beck, 2006).  Among its most important conclusions, it had determined that 
cattle were a ‘dead-end host’ for BSE.  This, however, stood in clear contrast to its own 
recommendation to exclude high-risk material from baby food. 
 
The publication of the Southwood Report in February 1989, nonetheless, caused a media storm.  
Following continuing public pressure, the government introduced a ban on the use of ruminant-
derived protein in the form of meat and bone meal in cattle feed, in June 1988.   This rule still 
allowed the use of meat and bone meal as feed for other animals like cats, sheep and poultry 
(HMSO, 1988; Maxwell, 1999).  At that time, there was no test for identifying the infective 
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agent in animal feed, and it must be assumed that a certain amount of it continued to be fed to 
cattle, especially as farmers had stockpiled contaminated feed.  Until 1994, MAFF 
representatives sought to quell public fears surrounding contaminated animal feed through 
claims that only large amounts of infected material could transmit the disease.  These statements 
were based on virtually no scientific evidence and were eventually proven wrong on the basis of 
experimental research. 
 
In line with the earlier recommendations by the Southwood Working Party, the Tyrrell 
Committee was created in June 1988, with the objective of providing further advice on BSE to 
MAFF and the Department of Health.  The Tyrrell Committee was tasked with analysing leading 
research and, with identifying what future research may be required.  The Committee published 
its report within a couple of months of being formed.  The report emphasised the need to 
develop scientific knowledge in a number of areas and cautiously noted that no reliable 
conclusions could be drawn on the spread of BSE to humans since the incubation period of 
Kuruvii could exceed 30 years (HMSO, 1994). 
 
During 1989, opposition leaders accused the government of complacency in the face of a 
potentially fatal disease.  However, in June 1989, in response to escalating public concerns, the 
government initiated a ban on the high risk material – specified bovine offal – from entering the 
human food chain. This measure again contradicted the official scientific advice given by MAFF 
which had categorically stated that bovine offal posed no relevant risk to human health (HMSO, 
1989).  Following fears that the use of specified bovine offal could result in a complete ban on 
meat and bone meal, the UK Agricultural Supply Trading Association eventually introduced a 
voluntary ban on the substance in 1989.  Much later, in November 1995, the government 
announced its own ban on specified bovine offal from mechanically recovered meat.  Both bans 
were not officially monitored and it is not clear to what extent the rule were followed. 
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In April 1990, a new committee, the Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee 
(Advisory Committee) was established in an attempt to provide scientific underpinning for 
future government policies.  During the following years the government largely adhered to the 
instructions given by  the Advisory Committee (Kewell and Beck, 2006).  The Advisory 
Committee itself produced two reports.  The first one was an  “Interim Report on Research” 
(1992), which endorsed further measures for handling BSE.  The second report “Transmissible 
Spongiform Encephalopathies:  A summary of Present Knowledge and Research” (1994) was 
aimed at providing a complete account of knowledge on BSE. In addition, in order to ensure a 
closer monitoring of the spread of the disease, the government established a CJD surveillance 
unit in May 1990. 
 
Having accepted a range of measures, government officials felt confident that BSE risks were 
now under control.   Accordingly, the first Advisory Committee Report (1992) concluded that 
all necessary steps had been taken to ensure the protection of human and animal welfareviii.  This 
confidence was consecutively undermined by three developments.  Firstly, the rate of infection 
proved to be higher than initially estimatedix.   Secondly, credible scientific confirmation 
emerged of the possibility of a transfer of BSE to other species.  Thirdly, and most importantly, 
a series of cases of the human variant of BSE were recorded from 1992 onwards. 
 
Public fears that BSE could affect humans gradually found confirmation by the early 1990’s.  
The first publicised case of CJD occurred in mid – 1992, when the CJD Surveillance Unit 
reported a 60-year old farmer as being infected to the Department of Health.  Following the 
death of the farmer, the CJD Surveillance Unit’s spokesman stated that the case was an outlier 
and that there was no evidence for a causal link between BSE and CJD (Sawcer et al. 1993).  
This view was maintained during a consecutive publicity campaign in which government 
officials reiterated the view that the two diseases were unrelated.  More recently, the Phillips 
Inquiry (2000) has suggested there had been earlier cases of CJD in 1989, which had remained 
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concealed from the public on account of MAFF’s denial of a link between the two diseases.  
Following the death of a second farmer in 1993, official sources continued to emphasise that 
there was “insufficient evidence to draw definite conclusions” (Davies et al. 1993).  When 
several farmers, whose herds were infected with BSE, died from CJD, evidence mounted that 
these farmers had contracted the disease from the contaminated environment (Smith et al. 1995).  
This was followed by the deaths of younger victims from the mid-1990’s onwards, which the 
press took as evidence of an escalation of the diseasex. 
 
In light of these events, government officials continued to emphasise the safety of British beef.   
Similarly, the Advisory Committee meeting in September 1995 concluded that there was 
insufficient evidence to link the BSE outbreak to the occurrence of CJD.  During the subsequent 
public debate, government officials maintained their position about the “absolute” safety of beef 
and proved unwilling to discuss the possibility of a threat to humans.  According to the Phillips 
Inquiry, MAFF officials, actively encouraged government scientists to maintain the party-line in 
answering public questions (Phillips Inquiry, 2000).   
 
By March 1996, with about 30,000 suspected cases of infected cattle and ten reported CJD cases 
in young people, the existing government view had become impossible to sustain. During 
March, an Advisory Committee meeting finally concluded that there might be evidence of a 
threat to humans.  On the 20th March, the Advisory Committee was forced to speed up its 
proceedings in order to pre-empt press announcements.  When the Committee issued a statement 
recognising that CJD was most likely caused by BSE, the government immediately announced 
that cattle of over 30 months (which was assumed to carry the highest risk of BSE) had to be de-
boned and that meat and bone meal could no longer be used in animal feed. Contrary to 
government expectations, these measures did not quell public concerns and, following protests 
and plummeting beef sales, a complete ban on cattle of over 30 months was introduced 
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(Hornsby, 1998).  As a result between 1996 and 1999, 3.3. million cattle were destroyed, while 
EU legislation prohibited all British cattle and beef exports6. 
 
The New Labour Government’s announcement that if would conduct a public inquiry into the 
BSE crisis which would start as early as December 1997 marked the end of the BSE crisis as a 
political event.  This was primarily the case because agricultural policy at this stage had become 
largely reactive with regard to European demands; with no further steps to uphold the original 
UK position denying the dangers of BSE being undertaken. 
 
4. The German BSE Crisis 
 
The events surrounding the German BSE crisis were initially connected to concerns about the 
safety of British beef.  Thus, following the lifting of the three year embargo on the export of 
British beef in August 1999, Germany imposed a ban on the high risk material from any country 
from the human food chain.  This raised issues about monitoring which led the German 
Consumer Association to demand that the Ministry of Agriculture and Food take responsibility 
for the monitoring and labelling of beef productsxi.  These regulations were passed in early 
October 2000.  Due to fears about beef from unknown countries entering Germany, this law was 
further strengthened in later October, with a requirement being imposed that labels for German 
beef products include information on the birthplace and feeding place of cattle, in addition to 
existing requirements for information on the place of slaughter.  In early November 2000, the 
expansion of the BSE crisis in the UK and France led several state governments to request that 
further measures be taken by the federal government.  These approaches were initially rejected 
as ‘blind actionism’xii.  However, by the 7th of November, the Green Party Health Minister 
stated that Germany might impose additional restrictions on beef imports against other EU 
countries who traded in ‘insufficiently labelled’ British beef.  Following the identification of 
two further BSE cases in France, the German Health Minister Fischer announced two new 
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measures.  Firstly, state government were to initiate BSE ‘quick tests’.  Secondly, EU countries 
were given six weeks to comply with German beef labelling rules or face sanctionsxiii.  A further 
media uproar was caused in mid November 2000 when the German Red Cross announced that it 
rejected potential blood donors who lived for more than six months in the UK for fear of CJD 
contamination (Wiener, 2002).   
 
By late November 2000, it had become clear that a planned nationwide programme of BSE tests 
could not be fully implemented due to capacity constraints.  In this context, further concerns 
arose from the fact that these tests would not cover cattle under two years of age (where the 
disease could not be diagnosed) which constituted about 60% of the German cattle population.  
Additionally, some state agricultural authorities criticised the testing regime as it did not cover 
potential dangerous British sheep importsxiv. 
 
General fears about the spread of BSE into Germany worsened when, on November 24th a cow 
which had been imported from Portugal tested positive for BSE in the state of Saxony Anhalt.  
This was followed in early December by an announcement by Health Minister Fischer of new 
emergency measure which required that all cattle older than 30 months that had been 
slaughtered had to be tested for BSE.  As part of this measure Fischer extended the ban on meat 
and bone meal to the feeding of all agricultural animalsxv. 
 
In late December 2000, the German BSE crisis took on temporarily chaotic proportions, when 
experts from the Federal Office of Meat Research warned that German sausage products 
presented a particular risk due to the use of mechanically separated meat products.  This led to a 
brief suspension of the sale of German beef products in Belgium which lasted from December 
23rd, 2000 to January 5th, 2001, as well as calls, by the opposition Liberal party for the 
resignation of Health Minister Fischer. Following heavy criticism from within their respective 
parties, Health Minister Fischer of the Green Party and Agriculture Minister Funke, a Social 
 14
Democrat, announced a package of new measures aimed at increasing consumer protection and 
strengthening ecologically friendly approaches to agricultural production.  Despite these 
announcements, Fischer and Funke were forced to resign only four days later, on January 10th, 
2001. 
 
The media attributed Fischer and Funke’s resignation primarily to delays in coordinating action 
with state governments as well as their earlier misleading statements that Germany was BSE 
free.  Typical for the mood of the time, the leftist newspaper Tagesspiegel commented 
somewhat polemically on Funke’s resignation: 
 
Funk was a lobbyist for the conventional agriculture.  He encouraged cheap production 
and was not concerned about where animal feed came from.  He attempted to protect 
‘his’ farmers rather than his consumers.  But in the end he did not help the farms, which 
had become discredited, partially ruined, and above all demoralised. This [Social 
Democratic] minister costs us years of progress, his motives were narrow and the only 
reason that he did not do more harm, was that he was unable to overrule the [Green 
Party] health minister Fischerxvi.    
 
Some political and commentators and academic researchers, meanwhile, conceded that both 
resignations had less to do with actual failures of policy and communication, than with the fact 
that the Social Democratic and Green coalition government had become increasingly 
factionalised and unstable (Barloesius and Bruse, 2005).    
 
Following the collapse of consumer demand for beef, comparable to the UK experienced some 
years earlier, the German Government announced in mid January 2001 that it would slaughter 
400,000 cattle over the next six months in order to stabilise the market.  These slaughters were 
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ultimately reduced to a much smaller number, with much of the meat being exported as food-aid 
to North Korea. 
 
During January the demand for beef, meanwhile, suffered further when the State Government of 
Hesse banned the use of cattle derived products in surgery and the new Health Minister Schmidt 
announced a ban on the use of high risk materials in pharmaceuticals (Loy and Steiner, 2003).  
This situation was further aggravated, when the first ‘German’ BSE case was detected in the 
state of Brandenburg.  Meanwhile attempts to implement the planned cull of 400,000 cattle were 
hindered by court proceedings alleging violations of animal welfare regulations and 
‘government-sponsored vandalism’xvii. 
 
On February 9th the German government’s BSE expert Von Wedel announced that a ninth 
expert committee would be formed which would be tasked with identifying weaknesses in the 
existing policies and systems for the protection of consumers against BSE.  The expert 
committee met in March 2001 and published its report in October of the same year (Barloesius 
and Bruse, 2005).    
 
Despite continuing concerns over the safety of German beef, the German cattle market 
recovered to about 60% to 80% of previous activity by the end of February 2001.  This was due, 
primarily, to cattle exports to Russia.  In March, however, the cattle exports were put to a 
temporary halt, when the Russian government objected to an export deal which had been struck 
between the Bavarian governor Stoiber and Moscow’s Major Lushkovxviii.   
 
These concerns about the safety of German beef were aggravated when an August 2001 
Government report noted that since December 2000, 98 cases of BSE had been registered in 
Germany, of which 47 had been detected in Bavaria.  Within the next months, the detection of 
further BSE cases in Bavaria and Thuringia led the German Association of Veterinary Medics to 
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demand the creation of a nationwide animal certification system.  This, and similar suggestions 
for radical changes in food-safety regulation were rejected by some state government officials, 
including the Bavarian Minister Sinner (Conservative), who argued the exposure to BSE risks 
had been drastically reduced due to the existing testing regime and the removal of high risk 
materialxix. 
 
Despite the detection of further isolated BSE cases in Thuringia, German beef consumption 
largely recovered by November 2001.  This, together with the publication of the Expert report in 
October 2001, and the implementation of a host of related administrative measures, marked the 
end of the BSE crisis in Germany. 
 
According to government minister measures were now in place to ensure “… the end of old-type 
agricultural policy.  In the future, consumer protection was to take priority over economic 
interest”  (Imort 2001: 4).  Symbolically, this change was reflected in the renaming of the 
Ministry of Agriculture into the Ministry of Consumer Protection Food and Agriculture, which 
was now headed by Kuenast a lawyer from the Green Party whose appointment was to 
emphasise a break with previous farm lobby supported agricultural policies. 
 
A key practical vehicle of this changed policy approach was, as had been advocated in the 
expert Report, the administrative separation of risk assessment and risk management in the form 
of the new Federal Office of Risk Assessment, which was to carry out its activities independent 
of the risk management activities of the Federal Office for Consumer Protection and Food 
Safety (Henning, 2003). 
 
5. Analysis 
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Previous comparisons of the UK and German BSE crises have suggested that there are 
fundamental differences in the governance of science in the two countries particularly as 
concerns the use of expert committees (Dressel, 2000).  Specifically Dressel notes that expert 
committees play a less formal role in policy-making as compared to the UK. According to 
Dressel, both German ministries involved in the BSE crisis saw it as necessary to invite experts 
only when they felt that they could no longer handle the urgent questions raised by the crisis. 
Dressel notes that the normal German way of handling a crisis such as BSE was for the Federal 
and State Ministers to invite scientific advisers on an adhoc basis.  
 
It could be argued that the greater autonomy of German policy makers may have had a limiting 
effect on the level of technocracy with which the crisis was handled, if only because civil 
servants maintained a more direct level of responsibility.   In doing so,  BSE decision making in 
Germany continued to be closely located within the political arena, and did not shift, as it did in 
the UK, towards a model in which policy-makers and scientists shared close proximity (Kewell 
and Beck, 2006).  This process, however, was eroded over time, as conflicting statements about 
the human risk associated with BSE created a more urgent need for the issue to be addressed on 
the basis of scientific evidence.  Ultimately, as in Britain, the evidendentiary gap regarding  the 
risks associated with BSE were not credibly bridged, and ultimately, as in Britain, the expert 
panels which were meant to provide independent advice, were increasingly seen as part of 
‘science for government’ (Lowi, 1992).     
 
The developments  which occurred in the later stages of the German BSE crisis were not 
dissimilar from those characterising most of the UK BSE crisis.  In Britain, MAFF, as the key 
government agency, gradually lost its credibility as a responsible risk manager, primarily on 
account of its failure to conduct an open and transparent debate.  This situation was mirrored 
closely by the German ministries involved in the management of the BSE crisis (Beck, Asenova, 
Dickson, 2005).  Here, misleading statements about a BSE-free Germany, undermined the 
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credibility of government policy much it did in the UK, following MAFF’s claim that BSE 
represented no risk to humans.  Both in the UK and Germany, the experts who were drafted in 
by the Government,  were effectively as a political means to an end, whose role was to reinforce 
the ‘party line’ and limit the commercial damage of BSE.   In Britain,  this network of ‘friendly 
scientists’ probably did more to undermine than to strengthen the position of MAFF, both 
because of their contradictory recommendations, and because of the proximity of their views to 
MAFFs original stance (Beck et al. 2005; Kewell and Beck, 2006).   
 
In Germany, government experts did not become a principal target of media and public blame, 
primarily because the expert advice given included proposals for genuine administrative 
restructuring.  However, in as far as advice concerning the elimination of relevant risks was 
concerned, German advisors too were seen as offering too little too late.  In this sense,  both 
counties were characterised by processes within which a crisis that was manageable in theory, 
became unmanagable because of the actions of government officials as well as, to no small 
degree, the experts they consulted (Kewell and Beck, 2006).    
 
The reason why German government experts and government officials acted in ways that were 
similar and divergent from their UK counterparts are probably difficult to answer.  Some of the 
reasons for a more pronounced and more speedy reaction to the BSE crisis in Germany are 
obvious.  At the time of the crisis Germany was ruled by a coalition government including the 
Social Democrats and the Greens.  This government was supported by political constituencies 
that valued risk averse policy making in as far as human health hazards were concerned, and 
took an adverse view of commercial interests which sought to minimise these concerns in the 
political arena.   None of this, however, explains the differing roles taken-up by the UK and 
German scientific communities and / or experts in relation to the BSE crises.    
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It is difficult to see why, for instance, much of the scientific community in Germany focus as 
their efforts upon highlighting the potential human health hazards associated with BSE, while 
UK scientists appeared to have adopted far more conservative positions. For lack of a better 
word, we describe this phenomenon as ‘risk sensitivity’ or ‘risk culture’. This risk sensitivity 
appears to have been far more pronounced in Germany, and what we can say, with some 
certainty, is that cultural context drove the production of a science of BSE in different 
directions.     
 
6. The Emergence of a ‘Science’ and ‘Administration’ of BSE in Germany and the UK 
 
Management research in recent years has placed renewed emphasis on the use of print media 
indicators in identifying developing research agendas and divergent approaches to research 
questions (Benders, 2007; Braam et al. forthcoming). In order to identify scientific interest in 
BSE we have analysed a major database including more than 2000 abstracts of BSE related 
articles published between 1995 and 2003 in international and national scientific journals in a 
wide range of disciplines. This database was collected by the National Agricultural Library of 
the United States Department of Agriculture (Larson, 2004).  For the purpose of this analysis 
these abstracts have first been classified by scientific disciplines and by country of publication. 
This analysis has been further refined by classifying articles as focusing on BSE as either an 
animal or human health issue and by extracting only those articles which were published in UK 
and German journals. In this context, a UK  or German journal was defined as a scientific 
publication that is either orientated towards an exclusively national audience or which primarily 
includes articles by authors from the two countries.      
 
Figure 1 depicts the total number of BSE related articles published between  1995 and 2003 in 
UK and German journals.  This figure corresponds to Figure 2 where these articles are 
disaggregated as being of UK and German origin.  As can be seen from both graphs, the number 
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of articles peaked in 1996 with a total of 56 articles, of which 45 originated from the UK, and 11 
from Germany. A second, but less pronounced peak occurred in 1999,  when 40 articles were 
published, of which 30 originated from the UK and 10 from Germany.   This pattern 
corresponds to an intensification of BSE focused scientific research in the UK, when the disease 
was primarily viewed as a British phenomenon.  The second peak in 1999, corresponds to a 
period of time in which BSE was reclassified as an international phenomenon.  Looking at 
German publications alone, there was a notable increase in BSE related work in the early 2000s, 
which reached a peak in 2002, when  it is became evident that BSE had become a German 
problem as well.  Both Germany and the UK showed a decrease in BSE related publications by 
2003 which is closely related to the near eradication of the disease following the implementation 
of national culling programmes and bans on high risk material and dangerous animal feed.   
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Table 1 show the articles which can be classified list as describing BSE as a human health 
problem as parentage of all articles published in each countries. As can be seen in the first (all 
Years), there was a significantly greater tendency among articles of German origin to address 
BSE as a human health problem (79.6%, as compared to 54.2% in the UK).   This pattern 
applies to the percentage calculated for all years taken together, as well as all individual years 
with the exception of 1995, when German BSE research was apparently still in its infancy. The 
disaggregation of these articles by subject group (Veterinary and related Journals; Food Science 
and related Journals; Others, including Medical Journals) shows that the greater propensity to 
frame BSE as a human health problem applies in most of the disciplinary categories we 
investigated; but was particularly pronounced in the case  of ‘Veterinary and related Journals’ 
where 64.7% of German articles made reference to BSE as a human health problem, whereas 
only 15.3% of UK articles did so.   
 
While it is obvious that print media indicator research has its weaknesses, such as being affected 
by the vagaries of editorial policies, there is a strong indication that Germany’s BSE research 
was indeed characterised by a different risk-culture with a more pronounced risk-sensitivity as 
concerns the human hazards associated with BSE.  It stands to reason that these differences in 
the nature and orientation of ‘scientific’ research on BSE, will have affected expert and public 
perceptions of the crisis in a manner similar to the actual policies adopted by the respective 
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governments. This probably is nowhere more obvious than in connection with the reforms 
adopted by both countries in the wake of the crises. Although an in-depth analysis of these 
reforms would go beyond the theme of this paper, it is worth noting the differences in the 
policies adopted by the two countries.  In as far as the UK’s creation of its new Food Standards 
Agency (FSA) in 2000 is concerned, the approach which has been adopted with its implicit 
merger of risk assessment and management functions can be considered at best to represent a 
conservative, consensualist solution.   
 
Table 1)   
UK   Germany 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Percentage of Articles framing  
BSE as a Human Health Issue    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
All Articles 
All Years (1995-2003) 54.2%  (90/166) 79.6%   (74/93) 
1995   60.0%  (9/15)    0.0%   (0/1) 
1996   57.7%  (26/45) 90.9%   (10/11) 
1997   50.0%  (11/22) 66.7%   (10/15) 
1998   73.3%  (11/15) 85.7%   (6/7) 
1999   43.3%  (13/30) 80.0%   (8/10) 
2000   56.0%  (14/25) 100.0% (11/11) 
2001   58.8%  (10/17) 76.9%   (10/13) 
2002   25.0%  (1/4)  68.2%   (15/22)  
2003   50.0%  (4/8)  100.0% (4/4) 
Veterinary and related Journals 
 All Years (1995-2003) 15.3%  (13/85) 64.7%   (33/51) 
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Food Science and related Journals 
 All Years (1995-2003) 25.0%  (3/12)  90.9%   (10/11) 
Others, including Medical Journals 
 All Years (1995-2003) 98.7%  (81/82) 100.0%  (28/28)   
 
 
 
 
Although the mission statement of the FSA highlights the agency’s intent of ‘putting consumers 
first’xx, the agency has failed to provide a critical analysis of the potential conflicts between the 
interests of food producers and the public. Indeed, academic research has criticised the FSA 
model as replication of the ‘old productionist model’ of food regulation, which fails to address 
relevant environmental, social and public health considerations (Lang et al. 2001).   
 
In Germany, meanwhile, the separation of risk assessment and risk management, respectively, in 
the form of the new Federal Office of Risk Assessment, and the Federal Office for Consumer 
Protection and Food Safety, has led to a critical reflection about the advantages and 
disadvantages of separation of the two functions (see, e.g., Boeschen, Dressel, Schneider and 
Viehoever, 2002). These analyses have highlighted the vulnerability of the new system, 
particularly as regards its limited ability to perform as an early warning function. This has led to 
calls for the creation an additional national risk forum, which would be tasked with identifying 
emerging risks.     
 
7. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have considered the ‘path dependent’ nature of the BSE crisis in the UK and 
Germany, and the contrasting development of risk aversion measures, and a policy framework 
for the development of a science of BSE, in each country. We would argue that the current 
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handling of the ‘Avian Flu’ epidemic can be seen partly as a path dependent outcome of the 
British experience of BSE; and of the institutionalization of an approach to ruminant disease 
control that puts animal, rather than human health, at centre stage in government plans to control 
the epidemic (Teece et al. 1997). This path dependency centres, in our view, around the 
treatment of BSE, and H5N1, as, foremostly, animal health problems; and a tendency, therein, to 
see zoonoses and human health protection as a second stage issues. Research into the UK BSE 
problem has tended to be undertaken along this pathway, therefore, whereas is Germany it has 
been seen, first and foremost, as a human health problem. In our view this has lead to the 
development of a more robust scientific pathway for evaluating animal viral risks to human 
health; and, ergo, the policy implications of those risks.  
 
In analysing the BSE crises in the two countries this paper has focused on two issues.  Firstly it 
has sought to identify the causes of these crisis, and more specifically the reasons why the 
governments of both countries failed to respond to these in a timely and effective manner.  In 
this context, it was argued that the failure of both the UK and German governments to manage 
these crisis effectively can be attributed to broadly similar causes, namely the prevalence of 
powerful entrenched interest groups clustered around agriculture and centralised or, semi-
centralised, decision making systems in which government agencies and these interest groups 
jointly create and control ‘science for government’ (Lowi, 1992). Secondly, the paper focused 
on the question of why the two countries responded to similar events in radically different ways.    
There are a number of possible explanations for this. Firstly, we have noted that, apart from 
obvious political differences, such as the presence of a Social Democratic and Green Party 
coalition government in Germany which were likely to have impacted on the severity of post-
crisis institutional reforms, there also existed more subtle differences in the ‘risk-cultures’ of 
both countries which predisposed Germany to implement more robust reforms.  Although these 
differences in ‘risk-cultures’ are inherently difficult assess, we find significant disparities 
between the two countries in the thematic focus of print media, notably professional journals in 
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areas such as public health veterinary, studies and food sciences in the two countries.   We 
suggest that these disparities are illustrative of deeper seated perceptual differences among 
professional communities which, themselves, mirror broader social preferences with regard to 
the management of potential human health risks.    
 
 
 
 
 
8. Wider Implications  
 
 
Veterinary medicine and comparative medicine play an increasingly important role in the 
management of public health issues, such as the BSE epidemic and the recent Avian Flu 
outbreak in Suffolk; and the problems they raise for managing such risks internationally (Lupton 
1999).  They also exemplify the challenges to government and science raised by animal borne 
health epidemics such BSE and Bird Flu in a global context (Ibid.); whilst shedding light upon 
the weaknesses and shortfalls of  government regulation and agri-food industry business models 
that, it can be argued, help to perpetuate the spread of animal borne health hazards over great 
distances very rapidly. This has partly been facilitated by the globalization of the supply chain; 
and the ‘traffic’ this has created.  Our ability to control animal borne epidemics is therefore a 
measure of our sophistication as societies, and, as Lupton (1999:14) notes, is a symbol of our 
progression as a science based civilization (see also: Lash et al. 1996; Burgess 2006). 
 
While it appears that the UK is following a path dependent legacy set by BSE, there has, 
nevertheless,  been a shift in government attitudes towards planning for such outbreaks. Thus in 
two recent commons statements, the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs, David Miliband has described detailed emergency plans for the management of an 
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HN51 outbreak, should the virus jump the species gap. Thus, while government has 
acknowledge some of the mistakes made over the handling of BSE,  particularly in terms of 
communication (Kewell and Beck, 2006), and the dismantling of MAFF and its replacement 
with the independent FSA, the central concern of government remains one of curtailing damage 
to the poultry industry, key agribusinesses such as Bernard Matthews, and the monopoly market 
positions enjoyed by such firms; and to do as much as possible to prevent the imposition of the 
kinds of export bans than followed BSE. Other past behaviours remain, such as the 
government’s reluctance to introduce an ban on meat imports from Hungary, when it has done 
so for other infected countries, and of being unable to explain holes in the evidence chain 
between the appearance of the H5N1 strain in Hungary, and its transportation to Suffolk. Defra 
has been criticised for giving inconsistent advice to poultry keepers, and of increasing the risks 
to human health by choosing to transport birds for incineration in Staffordshire (200 miles from 
the containment zone). While there is no evidence of supply chain contamination beyond 
Suffolk, the FSA has nevertheless been subject to criticism for declaring that turkey products are 
safe to eat, if cooked appropriately, whilst at the same time acknowledging that the virus can be 
kept alive in frozen meat. At the root of the government’s approach is a belief that at the present 
time, HN51 does not pose an immediate threat to human health, although it has developed 
elaborate contingency plans for dealing with a human epidemic, should current patterns of 
zoonoses (from animal to human through respiratory transmission) adapt at some point in the 
near future to a more virulent pathology involving either human to human transmission or food 
chain transmission. In doing so, current government strategy has stayed close to, but moved 
away from, the policies MAFF initiated in response to BSE, basing their actions on the findings 
of government scientists but communicating this more readily to the public; and by treating 
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Avian Flu as an animal health problem, but creating contingencies for a human epidemic; which 
is nevertheless substantially downplayed in most government communications.  
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